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DIRECTORATE OF  
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~~C~~ GUATEMALA-UK: The Arana government has launched the opening salvo of a diplomatic and propaganda campaign opposing Britain's increased military presence in British Honduras.

In a communiqué released yesterday evening, the Foreign Ministry characterized London's decision to increase permanently the size of its garrison and particularly to station Gurkha infantry units in the colony as an act of aggression and a threat to the integrity of the hemisphere. The communiqué further stated that all negotiations with Britain had been suspended and that the government would take the necessary measures to protect the national interest and dignity of Guatemala.

The government noted that secret negotiations between Foreign Minister Herrera and British Minister of State Godber in Washington yesterday had been unproductive. The British had refused to reduce troop strength to normal levels, had refused to compromise on the number of reinforcements, and had insisted on replacing Grenadiers with Gurkhas.

In view of previous government concern that the British troop reinforcement decision be kept secret, the Arana decision to publicize the matter is a particularly significant indication that the government is willing to commit its entire prestige to an all-out effort to reverse the British decision.

Herrera, when he returns home, may try to persuade the cabinet to make a further attempt to win a compromise agreement from the British. Arana and his more impulsive advisers, however, may decide instead to bring the matter before the OAS and may take provocative military steps which would further undermine British willingness to leave themselves exposed to a Guatemalan surprise attack. Nationalistic sentiment, moreover, may become aroused to such an extent that the government's ability to compromise is severely restricted.

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FINLAND: The Communist Party's moderate majority is feeling the pressure from its conservative rivals as it approaches a party congress on 31 March, but the moderates are not likely to lose control.

Leaders of both factions visited Moscow together in mid-February to offer divergent views on decisions to be ratified at the congress. The Soviets avoided supporting either faction and admonished them to achieve unity. The two factions subsequently appointed an eight-man negotiating committee, which apparently has failed to resolve differences.

Although the conservatives have fared badly in recent trade union and national elections--they will have 34 fewer delegates than the moderates at the congress--they are demanding increased representation on the party's leading organs. They also insist on denouncing the Social Democrats, with whose minority government the moderates cooperate selectively and apparently hope to join later in the year.

The Communists also are divided on the wage demands they are currently making during Finland's annual contract negotiations. The conservatives oppose any over-all wage pact at all. This split complicates the search for agreement on demands by the national trade union organization, which is dominated by the Social Democrats. A nationwide wage settlement, in turn, is a key factor in renewing Finland's economic stabilization program, due to expire at the end of the month.

For some time the Communists' moderate leadership has been fearful of being outflanked by the conservatives and has adopted a militant pose. This shift accounted in large part for its refusal to participate in the government formed last month. Moderate district leaders, however, lately have shown more resolve. They voted on 29 February to refuse any further concessions from the conservatives.]

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The Communists' electoral front has followed suit. Although the moderates are likely to retain control at the congress, it is moot whether they will feel secure enough to face down future conservative advocacy of militant policies or prevent the conservatives from hamstringing the pursuit of policies they prefer.

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